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Monday, April 09, 2012
11:00 AM - 12:00 PM
CNLS Conference Room (TA-3, Bldg 1690)


Non-cooperative Mechanisms for Cooperative Utility Maximization in Repeated Games

Michael Littman
Rutgers University

Compared to typical single-agent decision problems, general sum games offer a panoply of strategies for maximizing utility. In many games, such as the well-known Prisoner's dilemma, agents must work together, bearing some individual risk, to arrive at mutually beneficial outcomes. In this talk, I will discuss three algorithmic approaches that we have developed to identify cooperative strategies in non-cooperative games. I will describe a computational folk theorem, an analysis of value-function-based reinforcement learning, and a cognitive hierarchy approach. These methods will be illustrated in both normal form and multi-stage stochastic game representations and the implications for the role of learning in games will be discussed.

Host: David Wolpert, CCS-3, 665-7914