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In this talk we concentrate on data integrity attacks to power grid data. Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored, transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator, and used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, rebalance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter readings can be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings. The contribution of our work are the following. In the special circumstance where all lines are metered, we derive canonical forms for 3, 4, and 5sparse unobservable attacks in terms of the graph of the power network. And, given a power network, we offer an algorithm to find them. We next consider the problem of using knownsecure PMUs to thwart an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. We offer a characterization of buses at which these PMUs must be placed to mitigate the collection of attacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NPhard. We show that it is sufficient to place p+1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks. Host: Kipton Barros, T4 and CNLS 