Modeling and Computational Enhancements for Efficient Transformation Wind, Rain and Fire into Electricity

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Views expressed are not necessarily those of the Commission

## Early fictions, frictions, paradigm changes and politics

300 BC Aristotle's elements
Air, Water, Fire, Earth, Aether
 'proved' voids impossible
taether fills all potential voids
Middle Ages Church adopts Aristotle's view
Punished for contrary views
Retarded the development of zero
1865 Maxwell publicly believed in aether but his equations did not have it
20th century: aether paradigm gradually disappears
Is aether reappearing as dark energy/matter?

## Acceptance of Paradigm Shifts

"A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather becausé its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that ," is familiar with it." Max Planck

"Ohhhhhhh . . . Look of that, Schuster ... Dogs are so cute when they try to comprahend quantum mechanicr."

## Electricity fictions, frictions, paradigm changes and politics

$19^{\text {th }}$ century competition: Edison v. Westinahouse $20^{\text {th }}$ century: Sam Insull's deal
franchise 'unnatural' monopoly
cost-of-service rates
1927 PJM formed
1965 Blackout: Edward Teller
"power systems need sensors, communications,
computers, displays and controls"
End of $20^{\text {th }}$ : Is there a natural monopoly?
1988 Joskow \& Schmalensee Markets for Power
1889 FERC just and reasonable market based rates
1996 Order 888 open assess/ISO rule monopoly paradigm starts to disappear gradually

## Structural change

"natural monopoly" concept is no longer relevant to current technologies and scale of markets

17,000 generators with 994 GW of capacity
159,000 miles of high voltage transmission
Reliability rules require redundancy
Millions of interconnected end users
$\Rightarrow$ Franchised monopoly shadow persists
Market power in non divested franchised areas
Transmission market power
ISO market design: Competitive game embedded in a cooperative game

## End-use markets

 gois io geit you jajo isy ljifsVertical demand curve in ISO markets
Consumers receive very weak price signals See monthly average price monthly meter: No real time price
On a hot summer day
wholesale price $=\$ 1000 / \mathrm{MWh}$ Retail price < $\$ 100 / \mathrm{MWh}$
Solution: smart appliances
real time pricing, interval meters and
Demand-side non-convex bidding
Large two-sided market!!!!!!!!


What is at stake in electricity markets? roughly

|  | load | generation | revenues | price |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | PetaWh | Gigo Watts | $\$ 10^{12} \mathrm{yy}$ | $\$ / \mathrm{kwh}$ |
| US | 4 | . | 0.3 | 0.1 |
| world | 16 | 4 | -2.0 |  |

The efficiency/innovation target is measured in $\$ 10^{12} /$ year
$1 \%$ savings is greater than $\$ 10^{10} / \mathrm{yr}$
(2) money cans is buy me love

## Paradigm change Smarter Markets 20??



What will be smarter?
Generators, transmission, buildings and appliances communications, software and hardware markets and incentives
what is the 21st century market design?
Locationally and stochastically challenged:
Wind, solar, hydro
Fast response: batteries and demand Harmonize wind, solar, batteries and demand Greater flexibility more options
FERC strategic goal: Promote efficiency through better optimization software



## Power Flow and Admittance

$$
\begin{aligned}
& G=\frac{R}{R^{2}+X^{2}} \\
& B=\frac{-X}{R^{2}+X^{2}}
\end{aligned}
$$

## ACModel (physics)

Pik $=G k^{*} \mathrm{Vi}^{2}-G k^{*}\left(V i^{*} V j\right)^{*} \cos (\theta i-\theta j)-B k^{*}\left(V i^{*} V j\right)^{*} \sin (\theta i-\theta j)$

DC Model (market model approximation. Can we do better? )
Pik $=-\mathrm{Bk}^{*}(\Theta \mathrm{i}-\Theta \mathrm{j})$

Network analogies and their problems

| analogy | owners | Commodity <br> lconduit | Displace <br> ment <br> network | other <br> issues | pricing |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| highways | public | unbundled | No | congestion | Gas tax and toll <br> roads |
| water | public | bundled | yes | other uses | usage |
| Natural <br> gas | private | unbundled | yes | storage <br> and valves | Price caps and <br> no withholding |
| Air <br> traffic | public | unbundled | no | No pricing | Ticket tax |
| parks | public | unbundled | no | congestion | Income tax |
| telecom | private | mixed | No | Busy signal | Price caps |
| railroads | private | bundled | no | congestion | Loose price caps |

## Air traffic controller as control

 area operatorTrip from DC to LA
$1 / 3$ goes thru Toronto on Air Canada
$1 / 3$ goes thru Chicago on United $1 / 3$ goes thru Dallas on American trip time: milliseconds Who gets the money from the ticket?
Is your Mother-in-law fungible?

## ISO Markets and Planning

Four main ISO Auctions Real-time: for efficient dispatch Day-ahead: for efficient unit scheduling Generation Capacity: to ensure generation adequacy and cover efficient recovery Transmission rights (FTRs): to hedge transmission congestion costs
Planning and investment
Competition and cooperation


All use approximations due to software limitations

## Complete ISO market design Not quite there yet

Smarter markets
Full demand side participation with real-time prices
Smarter hardware, e. g., variable impedance
Better approximations, e. g., DC to AC
Flexible thermal constraints and transmission switching
smarter software with Petaflop computers
electric network optimization has roughly
$10^{5}$ nodes
$10^{5}$ transmission constraints
$10^{4}$ binary variables
Potential dispatch costs savings: 10 to 30\%

## Approach to AC modeling

A nonlinear optimizer will find a local optimum
How do we avoid local optima?

1. Solve the $D C$ unit commitment
with a first order AC approximation Real/reactive decoupling
2. Refresh the approximation
3. stop or go to 1

Model gets large

## When the world is not convex market clearing can get funky

when the market is non-convex, linear prices do not necessarily clear the market
efficient solution settlements to do not address equities
Naïve Uplift Settlement
Make-whole payments
Charged to average load
$\Rightarrow$ 'Sophisticated' Multi-part Settlement
Nonconvex equilibria
Cooperative game theory
Convex hull theory


balancing market plus a lookahead efficiently dispatch generation, load, transmission and ancillary
 services every 5 minutes Subject to explicit N-1 reliability constraints
Within the flexible limits of generators and transmission

## PJM/MISO $\ddagger$ MLJUUEE LMPS 2: 0ct 2009 9jこう A M



$\Rightarrow$ scheduling and unit commitment market efficiently (from bids) schedule generation, load, transmission and ancillary services
Subject to explicit reliability constraints
$\Rightarrow$ Within the flexible limits of generators and transmission

Eight days a week is not enough to show I care

## MIP Paradigm shift:


$\Rightarrow$ Pre-1999 Lagrangian Relaxation MIP can not solve in time window
LR solutions are usually primal infeasible
LR inhibits modeling
凹Simplified generators
凹No optimal switching
$\Rightarrow 1999$ unit commitment conference and book MIP provides new modeling capabilities
New capabilities may present computational issues Bixby demonstrates MIP improvements

## Mixed Integer Program

## I didn't know what I would find there.

maximize $c x$ subject to $A x=b$,

$$
\mid \leq x \leq u,
$$ some $x \in\{0,1\}$

Better modeling for
Start-up and shutdown
Transmission switching
Investment decisions
solution times improved by $>10^{7}$ in last 30 years 10 years becomes 10 minutes

## Improvements in MIP (same hardware) one day unit commitment problem

| year | Cplex version | Time in sec | B\&B nodes |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1993 | 2.2 | 1646 (unsolved) | 110792 |
| 1995 | 4.0 | 88.8 | 22549 |
| 1997 | 5.0 | 66.5 | 18488 |
| 1999 | 6.5 | 4.2 | 396 |
| 2001 | 7.1 | 1.7 | 91 |
| 2003 | 9.0 | 1.8 | 98 |
| 2005 | 10.0 | 1.1 | 72 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 1.1 | 75 |

## Improvements in MIP (same hardware) one week unit commitment problem

| Year | Cplex version | Time in sec | B\&B nodes |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 1998 | 6.0 | 8000 (unsolved) | 44900 |
| 1999 | 6.5 | 907 | 35683 |
| 2001 | 7.1 | 278 | 5308 |
| 2002 | 8.0 | 152 | 3575 |
| 2003 | 9.0 | 172 | 3928 |
| 2005 | 10.0 | 118 | 2090 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 103 | 2220 |
|  | Eight days a week |  |  |
|  | Is not enough to show I care . |  |  |

## MIP Paradigm shift:

| ISO | previous approach | Date for <br> MIP | Estimated <br> annual savings |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| PJM | LR | 2006 | \$250 million |
| ISONE | LR/LP | Tbd | No estimate |
| SPP | LP | 2013 | No estimate |
| NYISO | LR/LP | Tbd | No estimate |
| MISO | LR | 2008 | No estimate |
| CAISO | LR | 2009 | $>\$ 25$ million |

## Combined Cycle Combustion Turbine

CT = combustion turbine ST = steam turbine

| Unit | Startup <br> Costs <br> $\$$ | Cost <br> per <br> MWh <br> $\$$ | Minimum <br> Output <br> MW | Maximum <br> Output <br> MW |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| CT1 | 4000 | 60 | 100 | 150 |
| CT2 | 4000 | 75 | 100 | 150 |
| CT3 | 4000 | 90 | 100 | 150 |
| ST | 0 | 0 | 130 | 210 |

## Total and Marginal Costs for combined cycle combustion turbine CCCT



_- Total Cost $\quad$ Marginal Cost

## Linear Residual Demand and Local Optimal Solutions

## Equilibrium Points - Local Optima




Open or close circuit breakers
Proof of concept savings using DCOPF IEEE 118 bus provided $25 \%$ savings N-1 for IEEE 118 \& RST 96 up to $16 \%$ savings ISO-NE network $15 \%$ savings or $\$ .5$ billion/yr Potential
all solutions have optimality gaps so higher savings may be found
Currently takes too long to solve to optimality Suboptimal solutions are acceptable

## Three bus example

Feasible sets for Gen $A$ and Gen B with transmission switching
No switching [2]: cost =\$50×180+\$100×30+ $\$ 200 \times 40=\$ 20,000$ remove AB [8]: cos $\dagger$ $=\$ 50 \times 200+\$ 100 \times 50=$ \$15,000


Feasible set with transmission switching: $\{0,1,7,5,6\}$

## Kirchhoff's second law for AC transmission elements

Big M method with non-negative variables and full $\mathrm{N}-1$ reliability
$-B_{k} \theta_{k c t}-P_{k c t}^{*}-M_{k}\left(2-z_{k t}-N_{k c}\right) \leq 0$
$-B_{k} \theta_{k c t}^{+}-P_{k c t}-M_{k}\left(2-z_{k t}-M_{k c}\right) \leq 0$
$B_{k} \theta_{k c t}+P_{k c t} \leq 0$
$B_{k} \theta_{k c t}+P_{k c t} \leq 0$
$\theta_{k c t}, P_{k c t}, \theta_{k c t}^{+}, P_{k c t} \geq 0$
$z_{k t} \in\{0,1\}$

## Enhanced wide-area planning models

enable a more efficient planning and cost allocation through a mixed-integer stochastic program.
Integration of more components of the planning process into a single modeling framework to improve planning efficiency.
Better models are required to
economically plan efficient transmission investments compute cost allocations
in an environment of competitive markets with locationally-constrained variable resources and criteria for contingencies and reserve capacity.

## A Possible Planning Model

decide on a set of future scenarios assign probabilities to each scenario Take transmission proposals Solve a large-scale stochastic MIP. find the investments with the highest expected net benefits
Determine the beneficiaries Allocate costs \& rights


## Five Year Strategic Plan

identify opportunities to enhance operational efficiency particularly RTOs and ISOs Promote operational efficiency in wholesale markets through the exploration and encouragement of the use of improved software and hardware that will optimize market operations
to deploy new modeling software and optimize their market operations.

## Future ISO Software

Real-time:
AC Optimal Power Flow with <5 min dispatch, look ahead and N-1 reliability
Day-ahead:
N-1 ACOPF with unit commitment and transmission switching with <15 min scheduling
Investment/Planning:
extension of day-ahead market Greater detail and topology more time to solve



# Computational Research Questions 

Decomposition and Grid (parallel) computing
Real/reactive
Time
Good approximations
Linearizations
convex
Avoiding local optima
Nonlinear prices
Better tree trimming Better cuts Advance starting points


## New hardware



1945, ENIAC 30 tons, 19,000 vaccum tubes, 1,500 relays, and 200 kilowatts 350 flops, 400 bytes


IBM Supercomputer Jump
32 processors 1.7 GHz and 128 Gbytes. 8.9 teraflops
5 terabyte memory

Harness "perennial gale of creative destruction" Schumpeter

## New software


"Everything should be made as simple as possible ... but not simpler." Einstein

The magical mystery tour is waiting to take you away, waiting to take you away.

