

= nan

Models, Optimization and Control of Collective Phenomena in Power Grids

Michael (Misha) Chertkov

Center for Nonlinear Studies & Theory Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory & New Mexico Consortium

Gainsville, Florida, Apr 28, 2011

Outline



- So what?
- Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL
- Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.
- 2 Grid Stability
 - Distance to Failure
 - Problem Setting
 - Extreme Statistics of Failures
 - Intermittent Failures: Examples
- 3 Grid Control
 - Reactive Control
 - Losses vs Quality of Voltage
 - Control & Compromises
- 4 Grid Planning
 - Network Optimization
 - Examples
 - +Robustness

・ 「 ・ ・ モ ・ ・ モ ・

三日 のへの

So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.

So What? Impact! Savings!

- 30*b*\$ annually is the cost of power (thermal) losses
- 10% efficiency improvement 3b\$ savings
- cost of 2003 blackout is 7 10b\$
- 80*b*\$ is the total cost of blackouts annually in US
- further challenges (more vulnerable, cost of not doing planning, control, mitigation)

Grid is being redesigned [stimulus]

- The research is timely: $\sim 2T$ \$ in 20 years (at least) in US
- Renewables Desirable but difficult to handle
- Integration within itself, but also with Other Infrastructures, e.g. Transportation (Electric Vehicles)
- Tons of Interesting (Challenging) Research Problems !

So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.

What is Smart Grid?



Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.



Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

Introduction

Grid Stability Grid Control Grid Planning So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.



Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

Introduction

Grid Stability Grid Control Grid Planning So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.



US power grid

The greatest Engineering Achievement of the 20th century

will require smart revolution in the 21st century

◆□ > ◆□ > ◆三 > ◆三 > 三日 のへで

Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.

Preliminary Remarks

The power grid operates according to the laws of electrodynamics

- Transmission Grid (high voltage) vs Distribution Grid (low voltage)
- Alternating Current (AC) Power Flows ... often considered in linearized (DC) approximation
- No waiting periods ⇒ power constraints should be satisfied immediately. Many Scales.
- Loads and Generators are players of two types (distributed renewable will change the paradigm)
- At least some generators are adjustable to guarantee that at each moment of time the total generation meets the total load
- The grid is a graph ... but constraints are (graph-) global

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

So what? Smart Grid Project (LDRD DR) at LANL Preliminary Technical Remarks. Scales.

Many Scales Involved

Power & Voltage

- 1KW typical household; 10³KW = 1MW consumption of a medium-to-large residential, commercial building; 10⁶KW = 1GW-large unit of a Nuclear Power plant (30GW is the installed wind capacity of Germany =8% of total, US wind penetration is 5%- [30% by 2030?]); 10⁹KW = 1TW US capacity
- Distribution 4 13KV. Transmission 100 1000KV.

Spatial Scales

• $1mm - 10^3 km$; US grid = $3 * 10^6 km$ lines (operated by ~ 500 companies)

Temporal Scales [control is getting faster]

- 17ms -AC (60Hz) period, target for Phasor Measurement Units sampling rate (10-30 measurements per second)
- 1s electro-mechanical wave [motors induced] propagates $\sim 500 km$
- 2-10s SCADA delivers measurements to control units
- $\bullet \sim 1 \mbox{ min}$ loads change (demand response), wind ramps, etc (toughest scale to control)
- 5-15min state estimations are made (for markets), voltage collapse
- up to hours maturing of a cascading outage over transmission grids

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

ntroduction	Distance to Fai
rid Stability	Problem Setting
rid Control	Extreme Statist
id Planning	Intermittent Fa

Problem Setting Extreme Statistics of Failures Intermittent Failures: Examples

= nan

Our Publications on Grid Stability

- 22. R. Pfitzner, K. Turitsyn, M. Chertkov, Controlled Tripping of Overheated Lines Mitigates Power Outages, submitted to IEEESmartGridComm 2011, arxiv:1104.4558.
- 21. M. Chertkov, M. Stepanov, F. Pan, and R. Baldick, Exact and Efficient Algorithm to Discover Stochastic Contingencies in Wind Generation over Transmission Power Grids, invited session on Smart Grid Integration of Renewable Energy: Failure analysis, Microgrids, and Estimation at CDC/ECC 2011.
- 16. P. van Hentenryck, C. Coffrin, and R. Bent , Vehicle Routing for the Last Mile of Power System Restoration, submitted to PSCC.
- 15. R. Pfitzner, K. Turitsyn, and M. Chertkov, Statistical Classification of Cascading Failures in Power Grids, arxiv:1012.0815, accepted for IEEE PES 2011.
- 14. S. Kadloor and N. Santhi , Understanding Cascading Failures in Power Grids , arxiv:1011.4098 submitted to IEEE Transactions on Smart Grids.
- 13. N. Santhi and F. Pan, Detecting and mitigating abnormal events in large scale networks: budget constrained placement on smart grids, proceedings of HICSS44, Jan 2011.
- 8. M. Chertkov, F. Pan and M. Stepanov, Predicting Failures in Power Grids, arXiv:1006.0671, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grids 2, 150 (2010).

Distance to Failure Problem Setting Extreme Statistics of Failures Intermittent Failures: Examples

MC, F. Pan (LANL) and M. Stepanov (UA Tucson)

• Predicting Failures in Power Grids: The Case of Static Overloads, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grids **2**, 150 (2010).



MC, FP, MS & R. Baldick (UT Austin)

• Exact and Efficient Algorithm to Discover Extreme Stochastic Events in Wind Generation over Transmission Power Grids, invited session on Smart Grid Integration of Renewable Energy at CDC/ECC 2011.



< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

ntroduction	Distance to Failure
rid Stability	Problem Setting
Grid Control	Extreme Statistics of Failures
rid Planning	Intermittent Failures: Examples

Failure Probability

- Normally the grid is ok (SATisfied) ... but sometimes failures (UNSATisfied) happens
- How to estimate failure probability (UNSAT)?

Static overload

- Power Flows. Control=Generation Dispatch. Constraints = Thermal and Generation
- Probabilistic Forecast of Loads (given)
- SAT= Load shedding is avoidable; UNSAT=load shedding is unavoidable
- Find the most probable UNSAT configuration of loads



▶ ▲臣▶ ▲臣▶ 臣臣 めのの

Introduction
Grid Stability
Grid Control
Grid Planning

Distance to Failure Problem Setting Extreme Statistics of Failures Intermittent Failures: Examples

Extreme Statistics of Failures

- $\bullet\,$ Statistics of loads/demands is assumed given: $\mathcal{P}(d)$
- $\mathbf{d} \in \mathsf{SAT}=\mathsf{No} \mathsf{Shedding}; \mathbf{d} \in \mathsf{UNSAT}=\mathsf{Shedding}$

Most Dangerous Configuration of the demand = the Instanton

- $\arg \max_{\mathbf{d}} \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{d})|_{\mathbf{d} \notin SAT}$ most probable instanton
- SAT is a polytope (finding min-shedding solution is an ●LP); - log(P(d)) is (typically) convex

The task: to find the (rated) list of (local) instantons

- The most probable instanton represents the large deviation asymptotic of the failure probability
- Use an efficient heuristics to find candidate instantons (technique was borrowed from our previous "rare events" studies of a similar problem in error-correction '04-'11)

Introduction	Distance to Failure
Grid Stability	Problem Setting
Grid Control	Extreme Statistics of Failures
Grid Planning	Intermittent Failures: Examples

Example of Guam



- Gaussian Statistics of demands (input) leads to Intermittency (output) = instantons (rare, UNSAT) are distinctly different from normal (typical, SAT)
- The instantons are sparse (difference with "typical" is localized on troubled nodes)
- The troubled nodes are repetitive in multiple-instantons
- Violated constraints (edges) are next to the troubled nodes
- Instanton structure is not sensitive to small changes in statistics of demands

◆□ > ◆□ > ◆三 > ◆三 > 三日 のへで

Distance to Failure Problem Setting Extreme Statistics of Failures Intermittent Failures: Examples

Example of IEEE RTS96 system



- The instantons are well localized (but still not sparse)
- The troubled nodes and structures are repetitive in multiple-instantons
- Violated constraints (edges) can be far from the troubled nodes: long correlations

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

• Instanton structure is not sensitive to small changes in statistics of demands

Distance to Failure Problem Setting Extreme Statistics of Failures Intermittent Failures: Examples

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

Path Forward (for predicting failures)

Path Forward

- Many large-scale practical tests, e.g. ERCOT wind integration
- The instanton-amoeba allows upgrade to other (than *LP_{DC}*) network stability testers, e.g. for AC flows and transients
- Instanton-search can be accelerated, utilizing LP-structure of the tester (exact & efficient for example of renewables)
- This is an important first step towards exploration of "next level" problems in power grid, e.g. on interdiction [Bienstock et. al '09], optimal switching [Oren et al '08], cascading outages/extremes [Dobson et al '06], and control of the outages [Ilic et al '05, Bienstock '11]

Reactive Control Losses vs Quality of Voltage Control & Compromises

Our Publications on Grid Control

- 20. K. Turitsyn, S. Backhaus, M. Ananyev and M. Chertkov, Smart Finite State Devices: A Modeling Framework for Demand Response Technologies, invited session on Demand Response at CDC/ECC 2011.
- 19. S. Kundu, N. Sinitsyn, S. Backhaus, and I. Hiskens, Modeling and control of thermostatically controlled loads, submitted to 17th Power Systems Computation Conference 2011, arXiv:1101.2157.
- 16. P. van Hentenryck, C. Coffrin, and R. Bent, Vehicle Routing for the Last Mile of Power System Restoration, submitted to PSCC.
- 12. P. Sulc, K. Turitsyn, S. Backhaus and M. Chertkov, Options for Control of Reactive Power by Distributed Photovoltaic Generators, arXiv:1008.0878, to appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, special issue on Smart Grid (2011).
- 11. F. Pan, R. Bent, A. Berscheid, and D. Izrealevitz, Locating PHEV Exchange Stations in V2G, arXiv:1006.0473, IEEE SmartGridComm 2010
- 10. K. S. Turitsyn, N. Sinitsyn, S. Backhaus, and M. Chertkov, Robust Broadcast-Communication Control of Electric Vehicle Charging, arXiv:1006.0165, IEEE SmartGridComm 2010
- 9. K. S. Turitsyn, P. Sulc, S. Backhaus, and M. Chertkov, Local Control of Reactive Power by Distributed Photovoltaic Generators, arXiv:1006.0160, IEEE SmartGridComm 2010
- 7. K. S. Turitsyn, Statistics of voltage drop in radial distribution circuits: a dynamic programming approach, arXiv:1006.0158, accepted to IEEE SIBIRCON 2010
- 5. K. Turitsyn, P. Sulc, S. Backhaus and M. Chertkov, Distributed control of reactive power flow in a radial distribution circuit with high photovoltaic penetration, arxiv:0912.3281, selected for super-session at IEEE PES General Meeting 2010.
- 2. L. Zdeborova, S. Backhaus and M. Chertkov, Message Passing for Integrating and Assessing Renewable Generation in a Redundant Power Grid, presented at HICSS-43, Jan. 2010, arXiv:0909.2358
- 1. L. Zdeborova, A. Decelle and M. Chertkov, Message Passing for Optimization and Control of Power Grid: Toy Model of Distribution with Ancillary Lines, arXiv:0904.0477, Phys. Rev. E 80, 046112 (2009)

Reactive Control Losses vs Quality of Voltage Control & Compromises

K. Turitsyn (MIT), P. Sulc (NMC), S. Backhaus and M.C.

- Optimization of Reactive Power by Distributed Photovoltaic Generators, to appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, special issue on Smart Grid (2011), http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.0878
- Local Control of Reactive Power by Distributed Photovoltaic Generators, proceedings of IEEE SmartGridComm 2010, http://arxiv.org/abs/1006.0160
- Distributed control of reactive power flow in a radial distribution circuit with high photovoltaic penetration, IEEE PES General Meeting 2010 (invited to a super-session), http://arxiv.org/abs/0912.3281



Reactive Control Losses vs Quality of Voltage Control & Compromises

Setting & Question & Idea

- Distribution Grid (old rules, e.g. voltage is controlled only at the point of entrance)
- Significant Penetration of Photovoltaic (new reality)
- How to control swinging/fluctuating voltage (reactive power)?









Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov http://cnls



Schemes of Control

- Base line (do nothing) $q_j^s = 0$
- Unity power factor $q_j^s = q_j^c F^{(L)}$
- Proportional Control (EPRI white paper)



• voltage control heuristics $q_{j}^{g} = q_{j}^{c} + \frac{r_{j}}{x_{j}} (p_{j}^{c} - p_{j}^{g})$ • composite control $q_{j}^{g} = Kq_{j}^{c} + (1 - K)[q_{j}^{c} + \frac{r_{j}}{x_{j}} (p_{j}^{c} - p_{j}^{g})]$ $= KF_{i}^{(L)} + (1 - K)F_{i}^{(V)}$

•Hybrid (composite at V=1 built in proportional)

$$\begin{split} q_j^s &= F_j(K) + (q_j^{\max} - F_j(K)) \Biggl(1 - \frac{2}{1 + \exp(-4(V_j - 1)/\delta)} \Biggr) \\ F_j(K) &= Constr_j \Bigl(KF_j^{(L)} + (1 - K)F_j^{(V)} \Bigr) \\ Constr_j[q] &= \begin{cases} q, & |q| \leq q_j^{max} \\ (q/|q|)q_j^{max}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{split}$$

Prototypical distribution circuit: case study

Import—Heavy cloud cover

- p^c = uniformly distributed 0-2.5 kW
- q^c = uniformly distributed 0.2p^c-0.3p^c
- p^g = 0 kW
- Average <u>import</u> per node = 1.25 kW

Export—Full sun

- p^c = uniformly distributed 0-1.0 kW
- q^c = uniformly distributed 0.2p^c-0.3p^c
- p^g = 2.0 kW
- Average <u>export</u> per node = 0.5 kW

- V₀=7.2 kV line-to-neutral
- n=250 nodes
- Distance between nodes = 200 meters
- Line impedance = 0.33 + i 0.38 Ω/km
- 50% of nodes are PV-enabled with 2 kW maximum generation
- Inverter capacity s=2.2 kVA 10% excess capacity

Measures of control performance

- δV—maximum voltage deviation in transition from export to import
- Average of import and export circuit dissipation relative to "Do Nothing-Base Case"

Performance of different control schemes



Hybrid scheme

- Leverage nodes that already have V_j~1.0 p.u. for loss minimization
- Provides voltage regulation and loss reduction
- K allows for trade between loss and voltage regulation
 - Scaling factor provides related trades

Conclusions:

- In high PV penetration distribution circuits where difficult transient conditions will occur, adequate voltage regulation and reduction in circuit dissipation can be achieved by:
 - · Local control of PV-inverter reactive generation (as opposed to centralized control)
 - Moderately oversized PV-inverter capacity (s~1.1 p^{g,max})
- Using voltage as the only input variable to the control may lead to increased average circuit dissipation
 - Other inputs should be considered such as p^c, q^c, and p^g.
 - Blending of schemes that focus on voltage regulation or loss reduction into a hybrid control shows improved performance and allows for simple tuning of the control to different conditions.
- Equitable division of reactive generation duty and adequate voltage regulation will be difficult to ensure simultaneously.
 - Cap reactive generation capability by enforcing artificial limit given by s~1.1 p^{g,max}

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Our Publications on Grid Planning

- 18. R. Bent, A. Berscheid, and L. Toole, Generation and Transmission Expansion Planning for Renewable Energy Integration, submitted to Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC).
- 17. R. Bent and W.B. Daniel , Randomized Discrepancy Bounded Local Search for Transmission Expansion Planning, accepted for IEEE PES 2011.
- 11. F. Pan, R. Bent, A. Berscheid, and D. Izrealevitz, Locating PHEV Exchange Stations in V2G, arXiv:1006.0473, IEEE SmartGridComm 2010
- 6. J. Johnson and M. Chertkov, A Majorization-Minimization Approach to Design of Power Transmission Networks, arXiv:1004.2285, 49th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (2010).
- 4. R. Bent, A. Berscheid, and G. Loren Toole, Transmission Network Expansion Planning with Simulation Optimization, Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2010), July 2010, Atlanta, Georgia.
- 3. L. Toole, M. Fair, A. Berscheid, and R. Bent, Electric Power Transmission Network Design for Wind Generation in the Western United States: Algorithms, Methodology, and Analysis, Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE Power Engineering Society Transmission and Distribution Conference and Exposition (IEEE TD 2010), April 2010, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Grid Design: Motivational Example

- Cost dispatch only (transportation,economics)
- Power flows highly approximate
- Unstable solutions
- Intermittency in Renewables not accounted



An unstable grid example



Hybrid Optimization - is current "engineering" solution developed at LANL: Toole,Fair,Berscheid,Bent 09 extending and built on NREL "20% by 2030 report for DOE

Network Optimization \Rightarrow

Design of the Grid as a tractable global optimization



Boyd, Ghosh, Saberi '06 in the context of resistive networks also Boyd, Vandenberghe, El Gamal and S. Yun '01 for Integrated Circuits

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov http://ci

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Network Optimization: Losses+Costs [J. Johnson, MC '10]

Costs need to account for

- "sizing lines" grows with g_{ab} , linearly or faster (convex in \hat{g})
- "breaking ground" l_0 -norm (non convex in \hat{g}) but also imposes desired sparsity

Resulting Optimization is non-convex

$$\min_{\hat{g}>0} \left(\operatorname{tr}\left(\left(\hat{G}(\hat{g}) \right)^{-1} \hat{P} \right) + \sum_{\{a,b\}} \left(\alpha_{ab} g_{ab} + \beta_{ab} \phi_{\gamma}(g_{ab}) \right) \right), \ \phi_{\gamma}(x) = \frac{x}{x+\gamma}$$

Tricks (for efficient solution of the non-convex problem)

- "annealing": start from large (convex) γ and track to $\gamma \rightarrow 0$ (combinatorial)
- Majorization-minimization (from Candes, Boyd '05) for current γ : $\hat{g}^{t+1} = \operatorname{argmin}_{\hat{g}>0} \left(\operatorname{tr}(\mathcal{L}) + \hat{\alpha} \cdot \ast \hat{g} + \hat{\beta} \cdot \ast \phi'_{\gamma}(g^{t}_{ab}) \cdot \ast g_{ab} \right)$

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Single-Generator Example



Other Examples

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

http://cnls.lanl.gov/~chertkov/SmarterGrids/

< □ > < □ > < 三 > < 三 > < 三 > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

Introduction Grid Stability Grid Control rid Planning	Network Optimization Examples +Robustness
rid Planning	

Adding Robustness

To impose the requirement that the network design should be robust to failures of lines or generators, we use the worst-case power dissipation:

$$\mathcal{L}^{\setminus k}(\hat{g}) = \max_{\forall \{a,b\}: z_{ab} \in \{0,1\} \mid \sum_{\{a,b\}} z_{ab} = N-k} \mathcal{L}(\hat{z}. * \hat{g}))$$

- It is tractable to compute only for small values of k.
- Note, the point-wise maximum over a collection of convex function is convex.
- So the linearized problem is again a convex optimization problem at every step continuation/MM procedure.

→ □→ → □→ → □→ □

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Single-Generator Examples [+Robustness]



Other Examples

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

http://cnls.lanl.gov/~chertkov/SmarterGrids/

Network Optimization Examples +Robustness

Conclusion (for the Network Optimization part)

A promising heuristic approach to design of power transmission networks. However, cannot guarantee global optimum.

• CDC10: http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.2285

Future Work:

- Applications to real grids, e.g. for 30/2030
- Bounding optimality gap?
- Use non-convex continuation approach to place generators
- possibly useful for graph partitioning problems
- adding further constraints (e.g. don't overload lines)
- extension to (exact) AC power flow?

◆□ > ◆□ > ◆三 > ◆三 > 三日 のへで

Bottom Line

- A lot of interesting collective phenomena in the power grid settings for Applied Math, Physics, CS/IT analysis
- The research is timely (blackouts, renewables, stimulus)

Other Problems the team plans working on

- Efficient PHEV charging via queuing/scheduling with and without communications and delays
- Power Grid Spectroscopy (power grid as a medium, electro-mechanical waves and their control, voltage collapse, dynamical state estimations)
- Effects of Renewables (intermittency of winds, clouds) on the grid & control
- Load Control, scheduling with time horizon (dynamic programming +)
- Price Dynamics & Control for the Distribution Power Grid
- Post-emergency Control (restoration and de-islanding)

For more info - check:

http://cnls.lanl.gov/~chertkov/SmarterGrids/ https://sites.google.com/site/mchertkov/projects/smart-grid

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov



Thank You!

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

http://cnls.lanl.gov/~chertkov/SmarterGrids/

◆□ → ◆□ → ◆目 → ◆目 → ◆□ →

Basic AC Power Flow Equations (Static)

The Kirchhoff Laws (linear)

$$\begin{array}{l} \forall a \in \mathcal{G}_{0} : \quad \sum_{b \sim a} J_{ab} = J_{a} \text{ for currents} \\ \forall (a, b) \in \mathcal{G}_{1} : \quad J_{ab} z_{ab} = V_{a} - V_{b} \text{ for potentials} \\ \Rightarrow \forall (a, b) \in \mathcal{G}_{1} : \quad J_{a} = \sum_{b \in \mathcal{G}_{0}} Y_{ab} V_{b} \\ \hat{Y} = (Y_{ab}|a, b \in \mathcal{G}_{0}), \quad \forall \{a, b\} : Y_{ab} = \begin{cases} 0, & a \neq b, & a \nsim b \\ -Y_{ab}, & a \neq b, & a \sim b \\ \sum_{c \neq a}^{c \sim a} y_{ac}, & a = b. \end{cases} \\ \forall \{a, b\} : y_{ab} = g_{ab} + i\beta_{ab} = (z_{ab})^{-1}, \quad z_{ab} = r_{ab} + x_{ab} \end{cases}$$

Complex Power Flows [balance of power, nonlinear]

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{G}_0 : \quad P_a = p_a + iq_a = V_a J_a^* = V_a \sum_{b \sim a} J_{ab}^* = V_a \sum_{b \sim a} \frac{V_a^* - V_b^*}{z_{ab}^*}$$
$$= \sum_{b \sim a} \frac{\exp(2\rho_a) - \exp(\rho_a + \rho_b + i\theta_a - i\theta_b)}{z_{ab}^*}$$

- Nonlinear in terms of Real and Reactive powers
- Reactive Power needs to be injected to maintain reasonably stable voltage
- Quasi-static (transients may be relevant on the scale of seconds and less)
- Different (injection/consumption/control) conditions on generators (p, V) and loads (p, q)
- (θ, ρ) are conjugated (Lagrangian multipliers) to (p, q), energy landscape

Energy Functional Landscape (Static)

Transmission Networks

(resistance is much smaller than inductance, $r_{ab} \ll x_{ab}$)

$$Q(\rho, \theta) = \underbrace{\sum_{\{a,b\} \in \mathcal{G}_1} \frac{\exp(2\rho_a) + \exp(2\rho_b) - 2\exp(\rho_a + \rho_b)\cos(\theta_a - \theta_b)}{2x_{ab}}}_{\text{reactive power "lost" in lines}} - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{G}_0} \theta_a \rho_a - \sum_{a \in \mathcal{G}_{\mathsf{loads}}} \rho_a q_a$$



Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

DC [linearized] approximation (for AC power flows)

- (0) The amplitude of the complex potentials are all fixed to the same number (unity, after trivial re-scaling): $\forall a : \rho_a = 0$.
- (1) $\forall \{a, b\}: |\theta_a \theta_b| \ll 1$ phase variation between any two neighbors on the graph is small
- (2) ∀{a, b}: r_{ab} ≪ x_{ab} resistive (real) part of the impedance is much smaller than its reactive (imaginary) part. Typical values for the r/x is in the 1/27 ÷ 1/2 range.

It leads to

• Linearized relation between powers and phases (at the nodes):

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{G}_0: \quad p_a = \sum_{b \sim a} rac{ heta_a - heta_b}{x_{ab}}$$

- Losses of real power are zero in the network (in the leading order) $\sum_{a} p_{a} = 0$
- Reactive power needs to be injected (lines are inductances only "consume" reactive power=accumulate magnetic energy per cycle)

Preliminary Remarks
 < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ >

Model of Load Shedding

Minimize Load Shedding = Linear Programming for DC

$$LP_{DC}(\mathbf{d}|\mathcal{G}; \mathbf{x}; \mathbf{u}; \mathbf{P}) = \min_{\mathbf{f}, \varphi, \mathbf{p}, \mathbf{s}} \left(\sum_{a \in \mathcal{G}_d} s_a \right)_{COND(\mathbf{f}, \varphi, \mathbf{p}, \mathbf{d}, \mathbf{s}|\mathcal{G}; \mathbf{x}; \mathbf{u}; \mathbf{P})}$$

$$COND = COND_{flow} \cup COND_{DC} \cup COND_{edge} \cup COND_{power} \cup COND_{over}$$

$$COND_{flow} = \left(\forall a: \sum_{b \sim a} f_{ab} = \begin{cases} p_a, & a \in \mathcal{G}_p \\ -d_a + s_a, & a \in \mathcal{G}_d \\ 0, & a \in \mathcal{G}_0 \setminus (\mathcal{G}_p \cup \mathcal{G}_d) \end{cases} \right)$$

$$COND_{DC} = \left(\forall \{a, b\} : \varphi_a - \varphi_b + x_{ab}f_{ab} = 0 \right), \quad COND_{edge} = \left(\forall \{a, b\} : -u_{ab} \leq f_{ab} \leq u_{ab} \right)$$

$$COND_{power} = \left(\forall a: 0 \leq p_a \leq P_a \right), \quad COND_{over} = \left(\forall a: 0 \leq s_a \leq d_a \right)$$

 φ -phases; f -power flows through edges; x - inductances of edges \checkmark Instanto

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

Instantons for Wind Generation

Setting

- Renewables is the source of fluctuations
- Loads are fixed (5 min scale)
- Standard generation is adjusted according to a droop control (low-parametric, linear)

Results

- The instanton algorithm discovers most probable UNSAT events
- The algorithm is EXACT and EFFICIENT (polynomial)
- Illustrate utility and performance on IEEE RTS-96 example extended with additions of 10%, 20% and 30% of renewable generation.

Simulations: IEEE RTS-96 + renewables

10% of penetration - localization, long correlations

20% of penetration - worst damage, leading instanton is delocalized

30% of penetration spreading and diversifying decreases the damage, instantons are localized





Single-Generator Examples (II)



Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

http://cnls.lanl.gov/~chertkov/SmarterGrids/

Single Generator Example

Multi-Generator Example



✓ Single Generator Example

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov http

Single-Generator Examples [+Robustness] (II)



Single Generator Example [+Robustness]

Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

Multi-Generator Example [+Robustness]



Single Generator Example [+Robustness]

◆□ → ◆□ → ◆ 三 → ◆ 三 → ◆ 回 → ◆ へ ()

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov http://

Outline

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □



6 Supplementary: Failures in Power Grids

Supplementary: Grid Optimization

8 Statistical Classification of Cascading Failures

- Algorithm of the Cascade
- Phase Diagram of Cascades

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Rene Pfitzner (NMC), Konstantin Turitsyn (MIT) & MC

 Statistical Classification of Cascading Failures in Power Grids, accepted to IEEE PES 2011, http://arxiv.org/abs/1012.0815



(日) (圖) (문) (문) 문

= ~ Q Q

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Objectives:

- Have a realistic microscopic model of a cascade [not (!!) a "disease-spread" like phenomenological model]
- Resolve discrete events dynamics (lines tripping, overloads, islanding) explicitly
- Address (first) the current reality of the transmission grid operation, e.g. automatic control on the sub-minute scale
- Consider (first) fluctuations in demand as a source of cascade in the overloaded (modern) grid
- Analyze the results, e.g. in terms of phases observed, on available power grid models [IEEE test beds]

Building on

 I. Dobson, B. Carreras, V. Lynch, and D. Newman, An initial model for complex dynamics in electric power system blackouts, HICSS-34, 2001

Michael (Misha) Chertkov - chertkov@lanl.gov

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Algorithm of the Cascade



- Optimum Power Flow finds (cost) optimal distribution of generation (decided once for $\sim 15 \text{ min}$ in between state estimations)
- DC power flow is our (simplest) choice
- Droop Control = equivalent (pre set for 15 min) response of all the generators to change in loads
- Identify islands with a proper connected component algorithm(s)
- Discrete time Evolution of Loads = (a) generate configuration of demand from given distribution (our enabling example = Gaussian, White); (b) assume that the configuration "grow" from the typical one (center of the distribution) in continuous time, t ∈ [0; 1]; (c) project next discrete event (failure of a line or saturation of a generator) and jump there

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Tests on IEEE systems (30, 39, 118 buses)

 The base configuration of demand, d⁰ is a part of the system description. Contingency (in demand) is generated according to

•
$$\mathcal{P}(\delta_i) = \begin{cases} \frac{\exp(-(\delta_i)^2/(2d_i^0\Delta))}{\sqrt{\pi d_i^0\Delta/2}}, & d_i^0 + \delta_i > d_i^0 \\ 1/2, & d_i^0 + \delta_i = d_i^0 \\ 0, & d_i^0 + \delta_i < d_i^0 \end{cases}$$

- Δ is the governing parameter, measuring level of fluctuations
- Collect statistics averaging over multiple (200) samples for each D



Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Tests on IEEE 30 system



- Average # vs level of fluctuations.
- Stress Diagram. Average # of failures per edge/node. $\Delta = 0.1, 0.2, 0.9, 1.2, 2.0 \Rightarrow$



Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Tests on IEEE 39 buses



- Average # vs level of fluctuations.
- Stress Diagram. Average # of failures per edge/node.
 Δ = 0.3, 0.4, 0.6 ⇒



Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

Tests on IEEE 118 system



- 25 samples
- observed (run into) interesting sensitivity to distribution of line capacities

Michael (Misha) Chertkov – chertkov@lanl.gov

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

General Conclusions (3 phases)



- Phase #0 The grid is resilient against fluctuations in demand.
- Phase #1 shows tripping of demands due to tripping of overloaded lines. This has a overall "de-stressing" effect on the grid.
- Phase #2 Generator nodes start to become tripped, mainly due to islanding of individual generators. With the early tripping of generators the system becomes stressed and cascade evolves much faster (with increase in the level of demand fluctuations) when compared with a relatively modest increase observed in Phase #1.
- Phase #3 Significant outages are observed. They are associated with removal from the grid of complex islands, containing both generators and demands.

◆□ > ◆□ > ◆三 > ◆三 > 三日 のへで

Algorithm of the Cascade Phase Diagram of Cascades

< □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □ > < □

Path Forward (Cascades)

- From DC solver to AC solver
- Mixed models combining fluctuations in demands and incidental line tripping
- More detailed study of effect of capacity inhomogeneity (e.g. on islanding)
- Towards validated (derived from micro-) phenomenological model and theory of cascades [power tails, scaling, dynamic mechanisms]