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Center for Nonlinear Studies |
Exact potential games are those where the preferences of the strategy profiles of the different players are globally consistent, and therefore the players' payoffs can be aggregated through a joint function. In this talk, we analyze the general situation where there are local or global inconsistencies between the preferences of the different players. For this, we introduce a natural decomposition of multiplayer games in terms of potential and harmonic components. Besides its intrinsic interest, this decomposition facilitates the study of equilibrium and convergence properties of natural game dynamics. We discuss the implications for cooperative control problems, pricing schemes, and efficiency loss, and illustrate the results and techniques through an example of power control in wireless networks. Joint work with Ozan Candogan, Ishai Menache, and Asu Ozdaglar (MIT)
Host: Misha Chertkov, chertkov@lanl.gov, 665-8119 or the institutional host Frank Alexander, fja@lanl.gov, 665-4518.